Framing the Role of Envy in Transitional Justice

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Abstract

This article offers a conceptual framework for discussing the role of envy within processes of transitional justice. Transitional justice importantly includes the transformation of intergroup dynamics of interaction in the aftermath of societal conflicts and upheavals. Such transformation aims to realise “interactive” justice in transitional justice by reshaping belief and value systems, and by moulding emotional responses between the involved parties. A nuanced understanding of the emotions at play in intergroup antagonistic dynamics of interaction is thus essential to transitional justice. Among the many emotions that we could address in such scenarios, we target envy. Envy, in its various forms, features prominently in many societal conflicts and upheavals, and has, therefore, the potential to undermine or, conversely, support just intergroup interactions. However, the ambivalent role of this emotion has been scantly analysed in the philosophical literature on transitional justice. We make a start on filling this lacuna by developing a conceptual framework which is necessary to appreciate how envy and its varieties are epistemically and practically relevant to realising interactive justice in transitional justice processes.

Keywords: Envy, transitional justice, restorative justice, interactive justice, emulative envy, intergroup conflict.

0. Introduction

On August 10 1988, then US president Ronald Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act. This act authorized the provision of a $20,000 lump-sum payment to all eligible persons’ who had been adversely affected by an executive order signed by his predecessor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in 1942. Executive order 9066 authorised the forcible displacement of people of Japanese ancestry and their incarceration in isolated and secluded areas. From 1942 to 1945, 120,000 people, mostly American citizens, saw their human and civil rights violated: with only a few days' notice, they were forced to abandon their homes, leave most of their belongings behind, and to live in remote areas, in reconfigured buildings originally meant for livestock, without adequate sanitation or nutrition.

The last camp closed in 1946, but the executive act 9066 was only repealed in 1976, and it was not until 1988 that the US Congress would pass the Civil Liberties Act. The Act established monetary reparations to those

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1 Only living survivors were considered eligible, and heirs of those who passed away before the act was signed were not eligible, so many victims and their families did not receive any reparations. We owe to Tamiko Nimura this and other clarifications about this case.
incarcerated, or their heirs, and a community education fund. In addition, the government issued a formal apology towards Japanese Americans, acknowledging the “grave injustice” that was done to them.\(^2\)

From a philosophical point of view, the US government’s actions in 1988 fall within the domain of **transitional justice**, standardly understood as “a legal and philosophical theory and a global practice aiming to redress wrongdoing, in order to vindicate victims, hold perpetrators accountable, and transform relationships” (Murphy 2021). The last element of this definition is crucial for us: transitional justice importantly includes the transformation of intergroup dynamics of interaction within countries or communities which have experienced societal conflicts and upheavals. Such transformation primarily aims to reshape belief and value systems, and to mould emotional responses between the involved parties. A nuanced understanding of the emotions at play in intergroup antagonistic dynamics of interaction is thus essential to transitional justice.

The intersection between the philosophical discussion of transitional justice and the philosophy of emotions has a certain tradition. A number of philosophical investigations into transitional justice processes have discussed the roles of emotions such as blame and resentment, on the one hand, and forgiveness and apology on the other (see, e.g., Blustein 2010; Elster 2003; Mihai 2016). But the emotional landscape of transitional justice is certainly more varied: guilt, hope, shame, regret, contempt, fear, hate, envy, and jealousy are all emotions that move perpetrators and victims of the type of societal conflicts and upheavals that are usually the target of this approach to justice.

We focus on one such important but unexplored emotion: envy. We define envy as someone’s aversive, that is unpleasant or painful, response to a perceived disadvantage or inferiority vis-à-vis a similar other, with regard to a domain of self-importance, and which motivates the subject to either push themselves to the level of the envied, or pull the envied down to their level (cf. Protasi 2021; Lange and Protasi 2021). Envy is an inherently social emotion, whose concern is one’s relative positioning (D’Arms and Jacobson 2006) and whose main evolutionary functions are to “facilitate successful social competition for access to resources that affect fitness” (Hill and Buss 2008, 63) and to regulate social hierarchies (Lange and Crusius 2022). Thus, envy need not be dysfunctional, imprudent, or immoral, even though it can be detrimental to a person’s well-being and, more importantly for our discussion here, can wreak havoc in interpersonal contexts.

Let us now revisit the 1988 Civil Liberties Act, following the displacement and persecution of Japanese Americans during World War II. The context surrounding the Act cannot be fully explained without understanding the role played by a (racialised) form of envy towards the economic success of Japanese Americans.\(^3\) These emotions might have faded in the intervening decades, and such fading might have favoured the reparations and apology issued in 1988, but they have not disappeared entirely, as the resurgence of anti-Asian hate in 2020-2021 has shown.\(^4\)

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\(^{2}\) As the conference report on this Act summarises, the Act declared that “(1) a grave injustice was done to citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians during World War II; (2) these actions were without security reasons and without any acts of espionage or sabotage documented by the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, and were motivated by racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political leadership; (3) the excluded individuals suffered enormous damages for which appropriate compensation has not been made; and (4) the Congress apologizes on behalf of the Nation” (U.S. Congress 1988). The same act also included reparations for, and an apology to, the Aleut people of the Aleutian Islands, who were also forcibly relocated during WWII to camps in Alaska, where many died of disease (Madden 1993).

\(^{3}\) This form of envy often pairs with racialised forms of jealousy and resentment toward those who were perceived as inherently inferior, and thus undeserving of their success, but we will not be able to address these other emotions here.

\(^{4}\) For an incomplete list of such hate crimes in the US, see Anti-Defamation League 2020. For a more global perspective, see Human Rights Watch 2020.
Analogous emotional phenomena, as we expand on in this article, can be found in past events as diverse (but also tragically similar) as the Jewish Shoah (Holocaust) and the Rwandan genocide. Furthermore, racialised envy plays a role in all-too-current socio-political upheavals that scholars of transitional justice are focusing on today, such as the search for racial justice in many Western countries, and, in particular, the issue of reparations for slavery owed to African Americans (see, e.g., Murphy 2021; for a different, future-oriented, approach to reparations, see Táiwò 2022).

While the idea that envy has an important role in antagonistic dynamics of intergroup interaction has some empirical support, no conceptual framework is currently available to understand how processes of transitional justice should study this emotion and its varieties. We devote our discussion in this article to developing such a framework, focusing on four components. In section one, we introduce the first component of the framework, which consists in the concept of transitional justice as transformation of the parties’ dynamics of interaction. In section two, we then rely on the second component, the idea of “interactive justice”, to explain the role of just interactions between parties in transitional justice processes. In the third section, we discuss a further component, consisting in the emotional underpinnings of the relational transformations implicated in, and required by, transitional justice processes. In section four, we introduce the final component, presenting envy as emerging out of an array of illustrative intergroup conflicts. In section five, we use our conceptual framework to illuminate how envy and its varieties may be epistemically and practically relevant to realize interactive justice in transitional justice processes.

1. Transitional justice as relational transformation

One possible way to see the Civil Liberties Act with which we started is as an instance of restorative justice (Takahashi 2013). Restorative justice is a process, within transitional justice, that prioritizes reparations for wrongdoing, and reparations in the form of apologies, compensation, and forgiveness (see, e.g., Philpott 2012).

There is, however, an emerging trend in the philosophical debate that shows the limits of reducing transitional justice to a restorative exercise (see Ceva and Murphy 2022; Murphy 2017). The core limit of such a reduction is that restorative justice implicitly presumes that acceptable common standards of interaction pre-exist the actual interaction between victims and perpetrators. Such standards may thus be taken as a guide for reparations. Yet the existence and content of such standards are disputable. Processes of transitional justice should recognize that the standards of interaction between parties need to be debated, and need transformation, not just repair.

Associated with this core limit, more specific concerns about restorative justice concern its (1) tendency to reduce parties to either victims or perpetrators, which risks exacerbating divisions and stigmatisation; and (2) targeting of compensations for wrongdoing rather than understanding the relationship dynamics from which the wrongdoing ensues (Ceva and Murphy 2022). Most importantly for our purposes, the emphasis that restorative justice places on forgiveness and reconciliation risks frustrating the expression of negative emotions. However, processes of transitional justice are densely populated by anger, fear, resentment, jealousy, and, importantly for us, envy.

Before we can explain why studying envy is important to understanding antagonistic dynamics of intergroup interaction, as well as transforming them, some conceptual clarifications on the relational turn in transitional
justice are needed. Such clarifications will offer the first component of our conceptual framework for discussing envy in transitional justice processes.

The salience of a nuanced investigation into the role of negative emotions, in general, and envy, in particular, in transitional justice becomes apparent as soon as the transformation (not just the repair) of intergroup dynamics of interaction takes the stage. From this point of view, the subject matter of transitional justice is the quality of the relationships between subjects (usually belonging to different groups) implicated in a history of conflict, discrimination, and wrongdoing. The uniqueness of intergroup dynamics of interaction in transitional justice contexts justifies a relational focus. Such dynamics are tainted by structural inequality insofar as it concerns the terms of social interaction (Lu 2017), normalized oppression and human rights violations, and the ensuing uncertainty of the conditions of social cooperation and of the exercise of state authority (Murphy 2017). In such conditions, the quality of societal relationships becomes a distinctive concern of transitional justice in its own right.

The exact terms and conditions of the kind of transformation required to enhance the quality of intergroup dynamics of interaction may vary depending on the specific context where this process of transformation develops. Yet, by way of generalisation, we can posit that to study such processes means to discuss what may motivate parties who are emerging out of periods of conflict or wrongdoing to transform their antagonistic interaction into cooperative terms. Antagonistic interactions are characteristically tainted by the involved parties' mutual mistrust, which increases the emotional weight of dynamics of oppression, marginalization, and/or public stigmatisation (Deutsch 2000, 25-26). On the other hand, the marker of cooperative dynamics is openness to others, which means embracing a less obstructive emotional approach to interactions, which is capable of sustaining parties' mutual confidence and trust, despite the persistence of certain differences and disagreements. The philosophical study of transitional justice, from this perspective, consists in an analysis of the grounds on which parties may develop reasons for cooperation and how this change may be institutionally sustained.

To show how and why a relational transformation from antagonism to cooperation matters in the context of processes of transitional justice, consider, for example, processes of mediation. A mediator's role may certainly be assessed in light of the moral value of the results achieved by means of their action, for instance the quality of the compromise they helped the parties to negotiate. But mediation also has a transformative value (Bush and Folger 1994). Importantly, it requires fostering the parties' empowerment to seek solutions on their own, as well as reciprocal recognition. To this end, parties must overcome their mutual distrust and vent their claims in a protected setting, which may ipso facto change the way in which they look at their common past and their respective narratives.

Such a relational interpretation of transitional justice processes characterises the first component of the conceptual framework for our study. To understand and appreciate the affective dimension of transitional justice processes, the inherent properties of such processes should be the object of a specific investigation. Such an investigation should aim to analyse and assess the dynamics of interaction (that is, how the parties treat each other) that the process constitutes, or contributes to constituting, in society.
2. Just Interactions in Transitional Justice Processes

In the previous section, we have outlined a relational understanding of transitional justice. The analysis and assessment of transitional justice processes from this perspective focuses on the parties' just interactions. To wit, the core of this analysis and assessment is the just transformation of the parties' dynamics of interaction from antagonistic into cooperative terms.

To clarify, we refer to an interpretation of transitional justice as an instance of “interactive justice” (Ceva and Murphy 2022). Interactive justice focuses on the kind of treatment people are given and give to each other during their interactions in the context of institutional action (Ceva 2016). Through the lenses of interactive justice, the point of transitional justice is to set up processes capable of singling out unjust dynamics of interaction, analysing them, and understanding why they are wrong. In this way, parties may acknowledge and appreciate the terms of the relational wrongdoing implicated in their interactions. This is an essential step in changing antagonistic dynamics of interaction and, possibly, establishing cooperative ones instead.

The blueprint for such relational transformations may come from the experience of the many truth commissions established around the globe. Truth commissions are temporary bodies mandated to investigate the occurrence, causes, and impacts of specific human rights violations (Gonzalez and Varney 2013). One of the best-known processes of transitional justice of this kind was the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This was established as part of the transition to democracy after decades of institutionalised segregation and racism under apartheid, from 1960 to 1994. Truth commissions are investigative, rather than punitive or reparatory. Their end results consist of a final report of the findings about human right abuses, with recommendations on how to avoid similar abuses in the future. Such findings substantially draw on the victims' own testimony, which contributes to rendering interactions during the hearings respectful of victims' voices and their agency. Testimonies are taken as prima facie valid, as contributions to establishing the truth, rather than as pieces of evidence for cross-examination, as in a criminal trial. This kind of interaction can show the parties involved how to relate to each other in more cooperative (respectful), and less antagonistic, terms.

Focusing on the relations between parties engaged in transitional justice processes was the first component of our conceptual framework; the second component consists in thinking about how to realise interactive justice in transitional justice processes by transforming those parties' relations in a just way, from antagonistic into cooperative terms. We can thus further specify our framework as thinking of transitional justice as interactive justice. Note that the transformation of the parties' dynamics of interaction occurs because of the new set of reasons for action that the parties may develop in virtue of their engagement in a transitional justice process. Because of their participation in the proceedings of truth commissions, for instance, voiceless oppressed groups may acquire the normative status of a victim of a wrongdoing and, consequently, gain the moral authority to stake certain claims, and the right to be heard. In the same process, the perpetrators of the wrongdoing acquire a duty to listen, and to develop a readiness to engage with the other side by reckoning with the other party's claims. The inclusion of such reasons in people's practical deliberative sets changes the way in which people look at and treat one another. What's more, participation in the process enables both parties to see beyond their status as bearers of conflicting claims. Transitional justice processes, therefore, realise interactive justice when they enable the parties to look at each other as parts of the same problem, and as equally important factors for imagining the solution to that problem.
One question that emerges out of this discussion concerns what may sustain the parties’ commitment to acting on the new set of reasons for cooperation that participation in processes of transitional justice should be able to generate. Because antagonistic intergroup dynamics of interaction are characterized by a panoply of emotions, answering this question prompts a discussion of how transitional justice processes may purposefully mobilise this kind of emotional capital. Such a mobilisation is worth exploring in light of its potential to sustain or undercut the parties’ commitment to acting on the cooperative set of reasons that accompanies their participation in the process.

3. Emotions in Transitional Justice Processes

The relational transformations that processes of transitional justice aim to realise are cognitively difficult and emotionally costly for the parties involved. To realise interactive justice, as discussed earlier, such transformations require a significant reshaping of the parties’ own perspectives, of their understanding of their role in pivotal events in their own lives, and often in the life of a community or an entire country. Those who come to see themselves as perpetrators of significant wrongdoings may not only have to cope with newly-found guilt and shame, but also cope with loss of pride in what were previously considered honourable achievements. For example, this is often the fate of soldiers involved in mass atrocities or sexual exploitation and violence, but also of those who disown hateful value systems such as antisemitism or white supremacy.

The components of the conceptual framework we have outlined in the previous sections allow us to pinpoint the way in which the kind of transformation that transitional justice requires to realise interactive justice is not a by-product or a side effect of the process – it is the whole point. The emotional underpinnings of such a transformation may be an important resource for the process, as well as one of its main internal obstacles. Many emotional responses to such transformations and the context in which they occur may sustain or undermine the transformative process itself, and likewise the features of the ensuing dynamics of interaction between the parties. This consideration identifies the importance of exploring how transitional justice processes may purposefully mobilise a composite emotional capital in order to realise interactive justice. Such a mobilisation may take place either at the level of the individual or the collective, the latter perhaps even resulting in what William Reddy (2001) has called an “emotional regime”, namely the set of norms governing emotional life which underpin stable political regimes. For instance, during a successful transitional justice process, all parties involved will come to see that rejoicing in an ethnic cleansing or enjoying a lynching is abhorrent, and that the appropriate emotional responses to such events are horror, moral disgust, grief, indignation, and so forth. In other words, transitional justice processes may bring “outlaw emotions” to the fore (Jaggar 1989) and counteract them. This feature of these processes may help to address and transform a complex emotional regime and, notably, make the involved parties recognise that certain emotional responses, but not others, are not simply acceptable but normative – that is, the type of emotions they should feel.

From the perspective of characterising our conceptual framework in terms of interactive justice, we can best appreciate how these momentous changes in emotional regimes are not only an outcome, but a precondition of, a successful transitional justice process. This is the case insofar as such changes can help sustain the parties’ commitment to acting on the cooperative set of reasons that comes with their participation in the process. The capacity to appreciate the emotional underpinnings of the relational transformations that transitional justice processes realise is the third component of the conceptual framework of our study.
Before we introduce the fourth and final component of the framework, the conceptualisation of envy, combining the three components we have introduced thus far (the relational understanding of transitional justice, the idea of interactive justice, and the emotional underpinnings of relational transformations) prompts several groups of questions for the scholar of emotions who is interested in supporting the work of transitional justice. While we cannot develop each of them in full, we think it will be helpful to lay them out as a research agenda that our conceptual framework may sustain in the field.

First, and perhaps most obvious, is the question of the fittingness of the relevant emotions. We mentioned earlier how some previously unorthodox, but arguably fitting, emotional responses to lynching and mass murder can become normal and socially appropriate reactions. These are easy cases, presumably, from the perspective of any of the mainstream normative ethical theories. But there will be less easy cases, especially in the context of intergroup conflict. Some culturally-relative practices of a minority might elicit negative emotional responses in the majority, hindering reciprocal understanding. To give just two illustrations, consider the controversies surrounding the nomadic lifestyle of Roma people and other itinerant groups in Europe, or the practices of genital modification and mutilation performed in a variety of cultural contexts, with and without consent, on people of all ages, for an array of reasons, many of which tend to be hard or impossible to understand by people outside of the group that performs them (for a discussion of this, see, e.g., Galeotti 2007). To understand what the fitting emotional response to such practices is from outside of the group boundaries is a challenge in its own right.

The second question concerns the epistemic role of emotions, in addition to their practical action-guiding role. Emotions matter to transitional justice processes when it comes to both of these roles. First, investigating the emotions felt by the involved parties might help those parties to understand their dynamics of interaction better, shedding light on their motivations before and during their conflict. For example, recent philosophical research has analysed the risks and potential gains for the pursuit of justice of expressing anger in democratic public discourse (see, e.g., Cherry 2021; Lepoutre 2018; and Srinivasan 2018; contra Nussbaum 2015, 2016). In such contexts, those who listen to angry speeches can sympathise with the speakers, and gain a new insight concerning the claims of justice that the speaker’s anger expresses. Besides this epistemic value, the public expression of anger may have practical import, too. Insofar as such an expression offers an enhanced insight into others’ emotional landscapes, such insights may contribute to counteracting intergroup stereotypes, which would otherwise risk cornering the parties into opposed and irreconcilable positions. As discussed earlier, getting out of such corners is key to transforming antagonistic dynamics of interaction into cooperative ones, and thus to realising interactive justice in transitional justice.

This discussion, while cursory, shows the complexity of identifying the role played by the many morally relevant emotions in the processes of relational transformation required by the realisation of interactive justice in transitional justice. These emotions can have a productive or deleterious effect, and can themselves be affectively, morally, or epistemically positive or negative. What’s more, some emotions that often populate interpersonal and intergroup interactions in these contexts are practically ambivalent. Depending on their specific connotations, they may therefore have the potential to sustain or hinder relational transformations.
4. Envy in Intergroup Conflicts

Broadly speaking, envy is a social emotion denoting someone’s aversive response to a perceived disadvantage or inferiority vis-à-vis a similar other, with regard to a domain of self-importance (Protasi 2021; Lange and Protasi 2021). Envy has an ambivalent practical dimension insofar as, depending on its antecedent conditions, it motivates the subject either to push themselves to the level of the envied (constructive dimension) or to pull the envied down to their level (destructive dimension). Furthermore, again depending on antecedent conditions, envy’s constructive or destructive tendencies can be paradigmatically sterile (leading to counterproductive behaviours in the envier), or fruitful (leading to the envier’s successful emulation of the envied, or to the envied’s loss of their advantage).

Envy’s complex relational structure makes it a crucial candidate in refining the study of the emotional underpinnings of transitional justice processes. As we illustrate in this section, many conflictual histories of slavery, colonialism, racial segregation, and genocide suggest that envy is a constitutive component of the dynamics of interaction between the parties implicated in post-conflict or transitional scenarios.

Completing our framework with a conceptualisation of envy is thus important for two reasons. First, insofar as envy features prominently in the antagonistic intergroup dynamics of many conflicts, a framework for studying how those conflicts should be justly transformed must pay attention to the role of this emotion (inter alia) in fuelling the conflict. Second, because of envy’s ambivalent practical dimension, the just transformation of the parties’ antagonistic dynamics of interaction may usefully deploy strategies to defuse envy’s destructive or counterproductive tendencies, and to strengthen its constructive and fruitful ones.

We outline the conceptualisation of envy through some examples, in accordance with the general characterisation of this emotion presented at the start of this section. These examples refer to some notorious intergroup antagonistic dynamics of interaction which characterise the Rwandan genocide, the internment of Japanese Americans, and anti-Black racism in the United States.\(^5\) The diverse types and grounds of conflict that these examples illustrate are useful when it comes to appreciating the many facets of envy in intergroup dynamics of interaction, as well as the various ways in which this emotion may sustain or hinder the just transformation of such dynamics.

In the April of 1994, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, an event for which the Hutu blamed the Tutsi minority. The day after, massacres of Tutsi and moderate Hutu began, and the nation descended into bloody chaos for four months. At least half a million Tutsi were dead by the end of it.\(^6\) Many widows were raped and became HIV-positive, and about 400,000 children became orphans; many Hutus became refugees. An estimated one-third of the much smaller minority of Twa people was also killed.

To understand the events that escalated into civil war, take notice of some generally recognised factual elements concerning this case. German and Belgian colonial rule emphasised differences between Tutsi and Hutu, even though they actually spoke the same language and had similar cultural practices, regularly intermarried, and were physically very similar (so much so that, during the killings, many people were killed whose ethnicity

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5 For the purposes of our discussion, we focus on conflicts involving (perceived) race and ethnic differences. However, note that envy may also feature in other kinds of conflicts, such as class and religion-based ones.

6 Estimates vary, depending on the source. Even the lowest estimate of 507,000 people represents two-thirds of the Tutsi population at the time (McDoom 2020).
was wrongly identified). Colonisers favoured the Tutsi by giving them administrative roles and higher places in society. In the 1930s, Belgian rulers officially divided the population into three ethnic groups (Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa), issuing compulsory identity cards. According to what we could call a colonial mythology, Tutsi were naturally superior, more intelligent, refined, and beautiful. After independence in 1962, however, the Hutu majority turned the tables, and subjected Tutsi to strict quotas in education and employment, thus giving Tutsi women an incentive to marry Hutu men so that their children “might escape such tight controls” (Hintjens 1999, 247). Although Tutsi had historically considered themselves superior to Hutu, they now found themselves discriminated against (albeit never segregated or ghettoised).

To look at such factual elements from the perspective of our conceptual framework is helpful in locating the deeply entrenched antagonistic dynamics of interaction between the two groups between 1962 and 1994, which run much deeper than their crude manifestations during the civil war in the 1980s and 1990s. Once such dynamics are in focus, we can also appreciate how any just process of transition away from the conflict must grapple with, and transform, such dynamics from antagonistic terms into cooperative ones, as interactive justice demands (see §2). What’s more, our framework points out the importance of studying the emotional underpinnings of such antagonistic dynamics. Interestingly, even such critical voices as Helen M. Hintjens (1999), who resists the idea that the genocide itself was caused by intergroup antagonism, concedes that the conscious and deliberate political strategy that was mainly responsible, in her view, for the genocide, exploited and fomented such antagonism and its related emotional responses.

Among such responses we now want to highlight the role of envy. Indeed, the facts we have just reconstructed suggest that it is only natural that envy arose from both sides within the tense social and political circumstances leading to the civil war. While, to our knowledge, the role of envy in the Rwandan genocide has not yet been systematically analysed from a philosophical point of view, this emotion is mentioned in several discussions, both scholarly articles and anecdotal recollections of the events. For instance, envy is tracked as the basis of many reactions by the Hutu elites to the Tutsi’s increasing economic and professional success (Hintjens 1999, 257; see also Clanton 2006, 438-439; Jean 2006; Nurhidayat 2022). 7

Gender intergroup relations are also relevant in this context. For example, Hintjens writes about how Tutsi women were the object of sexual envy, because the wealthy ones were chosen as wives by Hutu political elite men after independence (see also Gallimore 2008, 20; Fielding 2014, 46). 8 Further support to the idea that envy did play an important role in shaping the Hutu-Tutsi dynamics of interaction via gender relations comes from Cristopher Taylor (1994, ch.4). Taylor discusses how Tutsi women were targets of both hate and sexual desire, often repressed, in the events leading up to and during the genocide. While Taylor does not use the word “envy” in his discussion, this emotion can be seen at work behind many of the gender norms and gender relations during that period. For instance, many powerful Hutu men had Tutsi wives or lovers, and a lot of anti-Tutsi propaganda clearly indicates that Hutu men had internalised the European stereotype that Tutsi women were more beautiful and intelligent. Thus, it is plausible that Hutu men envied Tutsi men, and that Hutu women envied Tutsi women (although Taylor focuses on the male part of this equation in his analysis). Both Hutu men and Hutu women likely perceived themselves as being in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis

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7 Franz Fanon, in *The Wretched of the Earth*, briefly explores the role of envy in analogous dynamics (Fanon 1963). Interestingly, in characterising the relationships between the colonised and the coloniser, Fanon speaks at length of envy, whereas resentment might be the more fitting emotion. We thank Samuel Elgin for this reference.

8 To reiterate, this was an inversion of previous hierarchies: “Tutsi aristocracy’s erstwhile proprietorial use of Hutu women was not yet forgiven, and the sin was now seen as compounded by Batutsi women’s supposed seduction of Bahutu elite men” (Hintjens 1999, 250).
Tutsi men and women, with regard to self-relevant domains (such as social status, personal attractiveness, and marital happiness). To bring envy into focus thus seems important to understanding central elements of the antagonistic dynamics of interaction during the conflict. It also seems a necessary component of any strategy for designing a just process of transition out of a conflict and towards the establishment of a cooperative form of interaction.

A somewhat similar dynamic of envy towards a social group that is both otherised and perceived as (economically) rising can be found in the events that led to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Historical discussions of the Japanese internment suggest that the economic success of Japanese Americans was a source of envy, among other negative emotions (again, envy is not systematically discussed, but is often mentioned, when discussing the causes of the internment – see, e.g., Taylor 1999, 165; Burton et al. 2011, 27; for a similar point about Japanese Canadians, see Granatstein and Johnson 1988, 101).

While no systematic analysis is available in this case, Protasi (2021) defends, for instance, the thesis that anti-Asian prejudice in the US has historically been imbued with envy. Reviews of anti-Chinese sentiment in the late 1800s reveal how initial praise of Chinese immigrants' work ethic slowly transformed into fear that these diligent labourers would steal jobs from Americans (see, e.g., Zia 2000). Immigrants from India were similarly initially welcomed and enjoyed the superior status of “Caucasians”, until that privilege was revoked and they were relegated to the inferior condition of “non-white Caucasians” in 1923. A similar path of initial integration and subsequent marginalization and persecution can be seen in the aforementioned case of Japanese Americans, whose financial success was bound to cause envy, in addition to resentment. The myth of the “model minority” is rooted in this history of envious prejudice: Asians and Asian Americans are the target of ambivalent feelings which are centrally underpinned by envy, an envy that is primarily connected to seeing oneself as disadvantaged with regard to financial welfare and success, as well as academic and career achievements. Asians are not outright despised as other racial minorities are (who may be stereotyped as “lazy,” “welfare recipients,” “criminals” and the like), and yet, since this envy is racialised, and combined with the perception of the envied as “other” and foreign, it cannot easily be mobilised towards constructive and emulative goals, but rapidly and easily turns into maliciousness and hostility.

A recent empirical study by Akiba et al. (2021) shows that, at least in the recent wave of “Asiaphobia” (as the authors call it) following the COVID-19 pandemic, envy was a key motivator. Both Protasi and Akiba rely on the Stereotype Content Model developed by Susan Fiske, Peter Glick, and their collaborators (for an accessible review of the model, see Fiske 2011). The model predicts that Asians are perceived as unlikeable but competent, and are thus more likely to be the target of envy. To conceptualise envy and pay attention to its role may thus be helpful in clarifying the stakes in the dynamics of interaction between groups, even in more ordinary situations of social antagonism (and even in the absence of dramatic forms of unrest as in the Rwanda civil war), and, consequently, to transform such dynamics into more just (cooperative) terms.

Finally, to bring envy into focus may also help us to analyse and understand antagonistic dynamics of interaction involving the targets of a paradigmatically contemptuous kind of racism, such as African Americans. Even though Black people tend to be at the bottom of the hierarchical ideology of white supremacy, that does not mean that they cannot ever be envied, since the perception of a group's identity is always dynamic and context-dependent.
In many cultures, scorn for the alleged inferiority of an ethnicity coexists with envy and admiration of some allegedly superior traits. For instance, indigenous populations all over the world are stereotyped as inferior savages with lower intelligence, but at the same time as more creative and artistic, and with more primitive and less sophisticated – but more “exotic” – looks. In particular, Black Americans have been perceived in popular culture as more athletic, as more musical and better at dancing (and especially at certain types of music and dance, of course), and as hypersexual. This set of features has made them objects of envy. An example of this type of envy is portrayed in Spike Lee’s 1989 film *Do The Right Thing*. In a famous scene, the Black protagonist Mookie remarks on how his racist white co-worker (and nemesis) Pino is a big fan of Magic Johnson, Prince, and Eddie Murphy. While Pino tries to explain the inconsistency away by suggesting that they are not “really” Black, Mookie suggests that Pino deep down wishes he were Black. This fictional scenario exemplifies a particularly ambivalent and complex instance of envious racial prejudice.

Taken together, the three examples that we have offered suggest that prejudice is always somewhat ambivalent, and that a dynamic of hate and desire could be traced in all of these scenarios, albeit manifested in different ways. To make reference to envy in the context of complex dynamics of intergroup interaction may be helpful to make sense of this ambivalence. This is because, as our working conceptualisation reveals, envy is inherently ambivalent, being destructive as well as constructive, counterproductive as well as fruitful. (We revisit this ambivalence in the context of transitional justice processes in the next section.).

To conclude this section: envy appears in a variety of intergroup conflicts. The cases mentioned in this section involve moral harm, even though there might be types of intergroup envy that cause only trivial harm (or no harm at all, if envy is benign, which we discuss below). In all of these cases, envy is felt by members of one group and directed towards members of another ethnic or racialised group. Sometimes this envy manifests itself within a personal relation that is strongly influenced by racial identity, as in Pino’s envy toward Mookie. Envy underpins a number of different antagonistic intergroup dynamics of interaction, both as a collective or an individual affective state, with the two levels – collective and individual – being distinct but related. The integration of a nuanced theory of envy among the components of our conceptual framework may thus offer important insights about transitional justice processes, since the parties involved in those processes engage both in one-to-one and group-based interactions, and any such interactions may be the target of transformative initiatives.

5. Envy in Transitional Justice Processes

Through the examples in the previous section, we have suggested the importance of bringing envy into focus to analyse and understand many intergroup antagonistic dynamics of interaction. We now want to pinpoint how integrating a conceptualisation of envy into the analysis and assessment of transitional justice processes may help us to gain a better grasp of how such processes should be structured in order to transform the parties’ antagonistic dynamics of interaction into cooperative terms, as interactive justice demands.

Because of envy’s ambivalent nature, to look at processes of transitional justice through the prism of envy may be helpful in two ways, both of which our proposed framework contributes to highlighting. First, to study envy’s destructive and counterproductive drives is significant in identifying an important (but currently under-theorised) element of the emotional underpinnings of the antagonistic dynamics that fuel many intergroup conflicts (whether more or less violent). Second, studying envy’s constructive and fruitful
e.g. emulative) effects may also contribute to understanding how the affective mechanisms typical of this dimension of envy can be mobilised to transform antagonistic dynamics of interaction into more cooperative (and therefore more just) ones.

Envy’s ambivalence makes it a complicated emotion. Its complexity is heightened by its sneaky nature. Envy tends to hide and mask itself. Philosophers have remarked on this aspect of envy since antiquity (see, e.g., Plutarch 1959), and psychologists have provided empirical support for it (Miceli and Castelfranchi 2007). Since envy is unpleasant to feel, and necessarily involves the notion that one is comparatively inferior or disadvantaged, and furthermore because it is often a stigmatised and morally condemned emotion, enviers tend to not admit feeling envy, even to themselves. Sometimes, envy masquerades as resentment, a righteous emotion that signals an alleged injustice (while envy is amoral and need not concern any wrongdoing). Even jealousy enjoys a more reputable status, connected as it is to the notion of protecting a good that one already has.9

Envy’s complexity suggests how unmasking this emotion, especially when potentially (or in actuality) malicious and destructive, is an important step for realising interactive justice in transitional justice. It is not possible to establish less antagonistic relations without addressing the green-eyed monster in the room, so to speak.

We must acknowledge that there is a degree of context-dependent variation in the concrete ways in which processes of transitional justice must address envy in its malicious forms, as well as mobilise the transformative potential of its benign varieties. Such variations by and large exceed the scope and boundaries of a philosophical discussion of transitional justice processes, as they depend on the empirical details of the various ways in which envy may manifest itself across intergroup dynamics of interaction. Notice also that even empirical works are scant in this department. Sociologists have overall neglected the study of envy. Even Gordon Clanton, the only contemporary sociologist who, to our knowledge, has written on the topic of envy in society, relies on either psychological evidence, dated sociological works (i.e., Schoeck 1966), or anecdotal evidence gathered by journalists (see, for instance, his discussion of envy in Russia in his 2006). Such empirical contextual considerations notwithstanding, we can offer a few suggestions about how our conceptual framework can illuminate our understanding of the role of envy in transitional justice processes.

First, even when envy comes in its malicious forms, when it underpins antagonistic dynamics of intergroup interaction escalating to civil war or genocide, this emotion retains its multifaceted connotation. Compare, for instance, the dynamics of envy in the context of the Rwandan civil war we discussed earlier to anti-Semitic envy. Jews have always been persecuted, marginalized, and literally ghettoised in Europe. Particular manifestations of envy towards an individual Jew, or groups of Jews, may have been fitting, and even non-malicious. A non-Jewish person might, for example, have envied their Jewish neighbour for accidental reasons, for example because of their greener lawn, without their envy being thereby antisemitic. However, the general sentiment of antisemitic envy is, by virtue of the vicious prejudice towards any Jew qua Jew that it embeds, always unfitting and very often malicious. Consider, now, the envy initially felt by Hutus during the early stages of the German colonisation of Rwanda, or even after independence in 1962, when antipathies and divisions were a lot more entrenched. In Rwanda, the divisions between ethnic groups were sowed by external colonial forces. The consequent envy was thereby based on very specific views, and a well-grounded sentiment of (purposefully created) intergroup competition. In this sense, Hutus’ envy might have been fitting at least some of the time, in particular before the regime started enacting a programme of dehumanising propaganda against Tutsis (Hintjens 1999).

9 For a detailed philosophical discussion and review of the psychological literature on these topics, see Protasi 2021.
The framework we have developed in this article can bring the emotional underpinnings of the Hutus/Tutsis’ dynamics of interaction into focus, and help to qualify the grounds of envy among such underpinnings. Our framework can thus offer important insights into the affective aspects that any process of transitional justice should address (and possibly counteract) in order to transform such dynamics in an interactively just manner. This exercise of transitional justice is important because it may enable the Rwandan population to look back at their history and acknowledge that they were pitted against one another, and that some of the negative emotions that arose from colonial practices were at least understandable, yet unfitting, because resentment, indignation, and anger at the colonial powers were the appropriate emotional responses, the emotions that should have been felt in response to the conditions they were facing. Those would have been the outlaw emotions that could have broken the emotional regime imposed by the colonial rule. Of course, it would be naïve to think that such acknowledgement is sufficient to heal a wound as deep as the one that affects post-1994 Rwanda, and it might well be too late now to overhaul a century-old rivalry. But thinking about these emotions might help future transitional processes to address similar, but less entrenched, conflicts.

What’s more, having a framework for studying the role of envy in transitional justice processes is helpful in highlighting that, even when envy is malicious, it is a common emotion that need not lead to genocide and mass murder. What is more, this framework can also help us to see how to mobilise the most constructive aspects that, we have seen, characterise this ambivalent emotion. Among the constructive drives of envy, we should mention its capacity to motivate people and groups to redress injustice (Frye 2016), to help place focus on undeserved success (La Caze 2001), and to highlight what has value in a human life (Thomason 2015). Envy may also have functional roles in regulating social hierarchies and facilitating successful competition for limited resources. Indeed, recognising and understanding envy, even in its destructive and counterproductive varieties, has an important epistemic function in recognising and understanding certain social phenomena, and bringing to light their underlying motivations. Such a recognition and understanding is an important pre-condition for addressing and for transforming such phenomena.

We can now see how to discuss the many ways in which envy need not be malicious, or acted upon, is important to recognise this emotion and to aptly mobilise it to transform intergroup dynamics of interaction in the context of transitional justices processes. Destigmatising envy facilitates admitting this emotion, and thus contributes to having honest and forthcoming interactions between parties to transitional justice processes. This is an important desideratum for processes which aim to transform antagonistic dynamics of intergroup interaction in a cooperative sense. Of course, envy is not the only emotional underpinning of intergroup antagonism that needs addressing in order to enable the just transformation that transitional justice processes promise. However, to bring envy out into the open is an important contribution (which is still waiting to be realised) to such an endeavour.

We finally want to underscore a further sense in which it is important that the design and practice of transitional justice processes recognises the contribution that non-malicious varieties of envy may give to their transformative efforts. Recall the earlier discussion of racialised envy. When envy is imbued with racism, it tends to be dehumanising and destructive. But while racism, as a general attitude, is inherently unfitting and immoral, and thus requires complete eradication, envy in the context of racialised antagonistic interactions can be emulative and productive. Emulative envy focuses more on the good than on the envied, and perceives self-improvement as possible; thus, it motivates the envier to level up to the envied, that is, to push themselves to the envied’s level in order to overcome their disadvantage (Protasi 2021). For instance, emulative envy towards the political achievements of other ethnic groups need not be destructive; it can, rather, motivate
one to fight for obtaining analogous political gains for one’s own group – the flourishing of student unions modelled after Black student unions is an example of this pattern. To have a framework for studying such constructive aspects of the envy that underpins the dynamics of racialised intergroup interaction offers an important prop for the relational transformative efforts that characterise transitional justice processes as we presented them.

Furthermore, even when envy is not by itself emulative or otherwise benign, it can be a transitional emotion, paving the way to the transformation of antagonist intergroup dynamics of interaction into cooperative terms. For instance, during the 1992 Los Angeles riots, many stores owned by Korean Americans were ransacked and looted. At least in part, these acts were motivated by spiteful envy towards the economic success of these new immigrants. Asian Americans and African Americans have subsequently become political allies, and often see themselves as united in the same struggle against white supremacy and racism (see Protasi 2021, 146-148, for an expanded discussion of this example). In this way, being the target of similar envious reactions has, in some cases, favoured the development of a cooperative form of interaction between groups, as the realisation of interactive justice in transitional justice requires. To generalise, to the extent that cooperative relations are recognised as loci of interactive justice, as discussed earlier in the article, our framework allows us to appreciate the contributory role of (certain forms of) envy in realising a more just society via transitional justice processes.

Appreciating the contribution that the benign varieties of envy may give to the just transformation of intergroup dynamics of interaction should not leave us with too rosy a picture of such an emotion. We have already remarked on the ambivalent nature of envy. But even the benign varieties of this emotion, such as emulative envy, are not always supportive of interactive justice in transitional justice. For example, emulative envy is not always fitting. When, say, emulative envy is addressed towards a group whose superiority is grounded in an injustice (e.g., in a form of domination), the fitting affective response seems to be resentment. An illustration can be seen, for instance, in the type of affective reaction that the colonised may have towards the coloniser (see contra Fanon 1963). Some other times, emulative envy cannot arise, because self-improvement is not possible. In such cases, perhaps, less constructive varieties of envy may arise. To be able to recognise and address them as such (by bringing them to the fore during transitional justice processes) is nevertheless important for analysing the emotional underpinnings of antagonistic dynamics of intergroup interaction and, possibly, transforming them into more cooperative terms.

Nothing we have said in this article offers a conclusive argument for assigning a necessary and non-fungible role to envy in transitional justice processes. The aim throughout our discussion has been to develop a conceptual framework for the study of such a role. This framework, we have argued, is helpful to see why and how envy matters, and how it should be factored into the analytical study and normative assessment of the emotional underpinnings of intergroup dynamics of interaction, in contexts relevant to the realisation of interactive justice in transitional justice processes. Individuating envy’s role in intergroup conflicts, differentiating between different varieties of this emotion, destigmatising it, and acknowledging the existence of constructive forms of envy can all help, epistemically and practically, to foster the relational transformations that transitional justice seeks.

To conclude, we submit that the most valuable contribution of the conceptual framework we have developed in this article is to offer the necessary conceptual toolkit for appreciating how envy is pervasive in intergroup conflicts and characteristic of many of the antagonistic dynamics of interaction which occur in those conflicts.
Therefore, admitting envy’s existence among the emotional underpinnings of such dynamics is crucial for their enhanced understanding and transformation. Admitting envy allows the revelation of prior perceptions of inferiority and superiority (epistemic value), and movement towards establishing more balanced, symmetric, cooperative, and, therefore, interactively just relations (practical relevance). Insofar as establishing such relations is key to transitional justice processes, as we claim, to have a framework for investigating the role that envy plays in its varieties can illuminate the dynamics of interaction in intergroup conflicts and, thus, importantly contribute to realising transitional justice in society.¹⁰

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References


