Received: 8 September, 2025
Accepted: 6 January 2026
Published: 1 June, 2026

For the Love of Hate: Hatred as Emotive Resistance

Katelyn Antilla; University: University of California, Davis, United States of America; kmantilla@ucdavis.edu

Abstract

Philosophers have focused a great deal of attention on the moral dimensions of our emotions, but relatively little on the value of hatred. This is a significant oversight, as there are serious implications for how we treat victims of gross injustice who respond or cope with hate. And although many variations of hatred are not liable to any genuine defense, this is not true for all varieties. While it stands against common positions within the literature, I argue that hatred is not always vicious, and that there exist varieties which are valuable to our moral lives. To establish this, I first taxonomize a few varieties of hatred, identifying a moral kind termed "Beauvoirian hatred" – inspired by the influential work of Simone de Beauvoir. Beauvoirian hatred, as I conceive of it, is a form of hate which we do no wrong in feeling—and perhaps is even good to feel in the face of serious injustice.

Keywords: Hatred, Moral Emotion, Moral Psychology, Fittingness, Ethics.

> "I was sad that summer was over.
>
> But I was happy that it was over for my enemies, too." – B.J. Novak

1. Introduction

It's a hard thing to defend hatred. Hatred is supposedly too poisonous, too corrupting, and solely a motivator of ill-will. In fact, Royzman et al. (2005) describe hatred as "the most destructive affective phenomenon in the history of human nature." Painted like this, it is no wonder why many people hate hatred. Yet, it isn't immediately clear what is so wrong with hating our moral foes or those who are hatemongers themselves. In other words: what is so wrong with hating agents who are vicious or evil? In the 1946 essay, "An Eye for an Eye," French feminist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir argues for the role of emotion, specifically of hatred, in politics and our social lives; concluding that hatred is, in fact, the metaphysical basis of the idea of justice (2004, 249).

In early 1945, Beauvoir attended the public trial of the well-known author and vitriolic anti-Semite, Robert Brasillach. In his weekly column *Je Suis Partout* (*I Am Everywhere*), Brasillach exposed the pseudonyms, names, and locations of French Jews in hiding. He was unremorseful for his treason and a passionate ally to genocide and was ultimately sentenced to death.

Following the trial, French intellectuals circulated a petition urging General de Gaulle to pardon Brasillach from the death penalty. Sponsors of the petition argued in a series of essays that the Nazi occupation was a reign of hatred that only love and clemency could combat. When asked to sign herself, Beauvoir explicitly refused, citing that people like Brasillach deserved neither her support nor the chance to live. Rather, Beauvoir was confident that she "knew how [Brasillach's] political attitudes were situated in the ensemble of his life" (257).

In response, Beauvoir was told that she should have stayed away entirely from the proceedings, as she had no business in tainting politics with her own personal feelings. Yet, Beauvoir was certain there was something overlooked both by the apathy of the trial and by the crusade of love by her fellow intellectuals. Just a year after Brasillach's execution, Beauvoir set out to clarify her refusal to sign the petition, and to register the role of dark emotion in our political lives.

This brings me to the main target of this paper: defending hatred. Although there are many forms of hatred that deserve no moral defence, hatred should not be painted in these broad monolithic strokes, given no nuance or differentiation. And while it stands against common positions within the literature, I argue that hatred is not always vicious. By painting hatred in this way, we ignore how it can be a powerful tool in defence of morality and in defence of our own self-worth, and as such deserves recognition as an emotive tool against injustice.

I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I begin by considering the current literature on hatred and where I think they get it wrong. In Section 3—using Myisha Cherry's analytic methodology—I go on to classify some of the varieties of hatred, examining why we ought to avoid treating hate monolithically. Here, I introduce a moral hatred, which I refer to as Beauvoirian Hatred, and Section 4 will focus the remaining defence of its value. Finally, in Section 5 I address challenges that arise from emotional overlap, and which call into question hatred's moral efficacy, and as such clarify hatred's value. I conclude in Section 6.

2. What It Means to Hate

Hate has been described widely as an emotion, but also as an attitude or a sentiment. My provisioned account of hatred sees us understanding it as an emotion, one which targets a person or thing in virtue of some enduring quality of the hated's identity.[1] Hatred as an emotion can be directed toward one's character, dispositions, or even at everything which one is. Conversely, a denotation of negative preference can be directed toward a being, object, or concept, which spurs aversion on non-moral grounds. For the purposes of this paper, I only speak to hatred which is directed toward agents, ignoring instances such as *I hate Dr. Pepper* or *I hate the Star Wars prequels*.

Further, due to its focus on an enduring quality, it is important that hatred is directed at character, rather than at mere action. We hate one for who they are or who they are becoming, but to hate an action is effectively to hate the actor's character for being disposed to take that action. Damian Cox and Michael P. Levine set this point out clearly (2021, 171):

1. For more exploration on why hatred is a moral emotion, rather than a sentiment or other affective property, see, e.g., Vendrell Ferran (2021), Szanto (2020).

> To say "I do not hate you, I hate what you have done" is to refuse personal hate. It is to attempt (perhaps disingenuously) to rise above personal hate. This is important for the fittingness or appropriateness of attitudes of hate since it is unfitting to hate a person on the basis of a single act when that act is wholly out of character.

Take, for instance, a characteristically compassionate and accepting boss who makes an offhanded offensive joke. They are not a fitting object of hate (though they do seem to be in need of reflection). However, a misogynistic boss who routinely undermines your professional development and takes steps to publicly belittle you does seem to be a more fitting target of hatred. Note that by "fitting" I am referring to Cherry's (2021, 36) definition of fittingness. On this account, to say that an emotion is fitting is to say that it makes sense to feel it toward a particular kind of thing.[2]

There are many different understandings of hatred both within and beyond philosophy. Often, philosophers renounce hatred that is directed at individuals, believing that it involves immoral and dehumanising methods of disvaluation. According to Roseman et al. (1994, 206), the motivational goal of hatred is to eliminate or destroy the target, either mentally (through humiliation, or by harbouring feelings of revenge), socially (excluding, ignoring), or physically (killing, torturing). Cherry (2019, 15), who is particularly focused on defending anger at injustice, similarly defines hatred as "a wish to eliminate the object. [Thus], the object of hate is not change or reconciliation." Again, we are prompted to associate hatred with the annihilation of the enemy, whereby elimination alone satisfies hatred's aims. Feminist theorist Audre Lorde's (1984, 152) words echo these thoughts: "Hatred is a death wish for the hated, not a life wish for anything else." These accounts of hatred criticise it on the belief that hatred is fundamentally destructive, not constructive—and is therefore lacking in moral value.[3]

When philosophers describe hatred as *fundamentally destructive*, they mean that, unlike more "engaging" emotions, it is not oriented toward improving its target. On these accounts hatred halts dialogue and reform, thereby impeding social and moral progress. It is often argued that, unlike hatred, "moral anger" is an expression of love that expresses active concern for the moral improvement of the target. In this sense, moral anger is critical and constructive. It signals that the object of anger has work to do and that the angry one cares enough to see that they do the work (Cherry 2019, 17). The central distinction, then, between the two ways of criticising a target lies in each emotion's aim. Anger seeks transformation; hatred, allegedly, seeks annihilation.

I agree that hatred does not aim to make the target better (if hate does spur the moral growth of its target, this is surely an unintended consequence or byproduct). But I don't think it follows that hatred is therefore destructive in every morally relevant sense. Hatred need not aim at reforming the target's moral character to be considered constructive. Rather, hate is focused on making the moral community better by signalling that this character is unacceptable. Whereas anger or love may engage the offender in hopes of change, hatred seeks distance. It withdraws dialogues, intimacy, and care for the target's growth. That distancing can itself carry constructive moral content, so we should be careful to not associate hatred solely with destruction.

2. For other accounts of fittingness, see Amia Srinivasan's "Aptness of Anger" (2018) and D'Arms and Jacobson's "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the "Appropriateness" of Emotions" (2000).

3. I do not have the space here to fully develop the globalist dimensions of hate; however, I am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to several valuable considerations on this point. One further concern is that hate's globalised nature may undermine its representational fittingness or appropriateness as a response to value, thereby grounding criticisms of hate that are not merely about its destructiveness. For example, Thomas Szanto (2020) argues that the globalised nature of hate blurs its focus and target, such that the hater becomes committed to hate itself rather than to the underlying values.

Of course, it *is* possible to wish for the total elimination of the hated. It is possible to wish for those you hate to die, or worse. However, not all hatred is like this. We can and do hate people without wishing severe punishment on them. Humiliating a target does not equate to their mental elimination and ignoring someone is not a social elimination.[4] It may be a diminishment of their social standing, of their confidence, or of their reputation, but it isn't right to paint this as a "death wish" for the hated. Simply put, hatred should not be understood in this way.

There is precedent for defending hatred. Notably, Jean Hampton sees hatred as a valuable emotion in our moral lives. Instead of seeing hatred as the desire for the destruction and elimination of the enemy, Hampton's understanding of hatred presents it as "a desire to triumph over him and his cause. . . .There is no desire to hurt the person *simpliciter* but only a willingness to allow such hurt if unavoidable in the pursuit of victory over his cause" (1988, 88). Understanding hatred in this way, hate is not necessarily a desire to harm or eliminate the enemy; however, it is distinctively coupled with ill-will.[5]

In recent work, Berit Brogaard (2020) also offers a defence of hatred. To do this, Brogaard grounds hatred as a Strawsonian "reactive attitude"—referring to our emotional reactions to wrongdoings or good-will within our social relationships. Brogaard identifies that hatred can mark a respectful reactive attitude which recognises the humanity within the hated target. While this work is incredibly valuable in defence of hatred, I seek a different mechanism of trying to convince the enduring hate-haters. Whereas Brogaard finds that certain types of hatred are valuable, considering their non-dehumanising expressions (and correct targets), I expand this position to capture how hatred can also be valuable in its *fittingness*. Moreover, by teasing out varieties of hatred, and by expanding on what a moral hatred will actively look like, I identify additional goods of hatred—namely, its finality.[6]

In sum, on my view, hatred is an emotion which targets a person in virtue of some enduring quality of the hated's identity, disposing us to withdraw from the target and to regard such withdrawal as appropriate. It includes a desire to triumph over the enemy and his cause, a condemnation of the hated's moral character, and is likely coupled with ill-will for the offender.

3. Giving Hatred a Chance

Hatred typically gets painted in broad strokes, all of which roughly communicate the badness of the emotion. The stereotypical image of hate is unchecked, all-consuming, and results in devastation. But we would be mistaken to assume that this is all that hatred is. I don't mean to say that hatred has not earned its vile

4. It is possible that the goal for removal of, or distance from, the hated *is* a kind of elimination; however, I'm unconvinced that this is the right way to characterise it. Part of why hate gets a bad reputation is the destruction it is associated with, but this is only warranted if said elimination is an overwhelmingly bad thing; ostracism and similar avenues of hatred are not, so we should not associate hate only with these extremes.

5. I am not convinced that it is a necessary condition for hatred to hold ill-will toward the target. For example, I may wish well on the hated for my own pragmatic purposes (to make their role in my life easier, to help the moral community by having an easy scapegoat for our negative emotions, etc.). For the purposes of this paper, I will stay neutral on the matter, as the view will be consistent with either conception.

6. Others have also defended the value of hate or paved the way for some such defence. Murphy (1988b) cautions against thinking that all kinds of hatred are immoral; instead, he claims, hate can be morally deserved. Hamilton (2021) construes hatred as a "burdened virtue" which, though corrosive to the agent, might be virtuous if directed against severe wrongdoing. Bell (2011) argues that "globalist attitudes" (i.e., attitudes which have whole persons as their targets) can be fitting. My argument is unique in suggesting that a kind of hatred is not just good or rational, but fitting, despite involving a complete disengagement from the target.

reputation. We do not need to look hard for examples of hatred gone horribly and violently awry (or perhaps horribly correct on some views). However, not all hatred looks like this; instead, hatred exists in varieties and can be a force against injustice and moral wrongs. Some views dismiss this, believing that hatred, in any form, is harmful and poisonous. For instance, Martha Nussbaum (2016, 50) argues that "hatred is *always* a bad emotion to have." Ideas like this, or the common colloquialism that *if you hate them, you're no better than them*, suggest that hatred comes in only one flavour. Yet, this is misguided. Intuitively, my hatred for a friend's cheating ex-partner is not the same as my hatred of a Nazi. My hatred for a coworker on the grounds of unpleasantness is wildly different than if my hatred were for moral concerns. Further, a racist's hatred is not the same as the responsive hatred for the racist.

In arguing that there are many types of hate, I want to make it clear that there are varieties of hatred that are not liable to any serious moral defence. Varieties of hatred have unique aims, perspectives, and action tendencies; and as such, they are all morally different. Yet, one could accept that hatred admits of varieties, but still argue that none of them warrant specific attention—that regardless of these varieties, hatred is still an inappropriate and immoral response.

Why, then, is it so important to recognise different varieties of our controversial emotions? Well, it is valuable to appreciate them for many reasons, notably because we can come to better criticise and value the emotion for its different forms. Further, there exists great emotional diversity, with many ways to respond to injustice (i.e., love, anger, pity, etc.). Hatred is one of these ways, but it has been largely ignored because of its distorted image. Thus, there are implications for how we treat victims of serious wrongs who respond to those harms with hatred. If hatred is someone's way to cope with injustice, then appreciating hatred's varieties can affect how we treat those who experience it.[7] As I will later consider, a hater's emotive evaluation of the situation (and of the hated) is potentially accurate and should be treated as such. People should not be urged to unanimously suppress or repress their hate; rather, we should take care to not broadly devalue hatred.

3.1 Varieties of Hatred

Here, taking cues from Myisha Cherry's analytic methodology, I taxonomise some of the varieties of hatred. Before beginning, it is important to note that this taxonomy is not exhaustive; we can, and should, recognise the other types of hatred that we engage in. I am also inclined to believe that there are other positive varieties of hatred, though I only identify one.

Some of these hatreds will overlap with one another, as when we hate we may do so with several motivations. *Pace* Cherry, emotive distinctions are not neat (2021, 15). Even so, it is helpful to see these types as separate varieties, all with unique *targets*, *action tendencies*, *aims*, and *perspectives*. The "target" of hatred concerns whom it is directed at (e.g., a homophobe, a boorish coworker, or even a certain group of people). By "action tendencies", I mean the particular behaviours that are typically motivated by hatred, though this motivation need not be actualised. The "aims" of hatred capture what the hate hopes to accomplish, or what end the agent is working toward, relative to their hatred. Lastly, the "perspective" which informs hatred is the unique way of thinking which allows the hatred to arise—meaning that hate is partially constituted by its judgements. All of this is important to consider because our emotions do not merely appear out of the blue; rather, they express who we are and motivate us to action.

7. Archer and Mills (2019) argue that demanding that victims of oppression feel less anger constitutes an affective injustice, by unfairly burdening them and ignoring the legitimacy of their emotions. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

Prejudicial hatred. As has been discussed *ad nauseam*, hatred often raises concerns about prejudice and injustice, conjuring up glimpses of bigotry, genocide, and other hate crimes. Let's start by considering a variety of hatred of this sort.

Prejudicial hatred is targeted and often weaponised against groups or classes of people, those who are deemed by the hater to be social "others." Those with prejudicial hatred hate people in virtue of a group status, one which has no bearing on their respective moral character. Seeing as this hatred is not based on one's moral character but rather features beyond one's control or perhaps arising from bad moral luck, those targeted with prejudicial hatred become scapegoats for the hater's needs.

The action tendency of prejudicial hatred is to eliminate the perceived opposition: the "others." This elimination may take numerous forms, either mental (through humiliation and degradation), social (exclusion—take, for instance the segregation that forcibly exists in apartheid states), or even physical (killing, torturing, and at its most extreme, genocide). In this variety of hatred, the action tendency is identical to its aim for the targets: both seek elimination.

The perspective that informs prejudicial hatred is a belief that social relationships are a zero-sum game (Cherry 2021, 19). Thus, when it comes to social or political ascent, one group's gain is equivalent to another's loss. As such, there is a belief that others rising socially must leave others behind—that one's well-being within society is designated by competition.

From this perspective, the prejudicial hater sees some of their peers as competition, rather than as social collaborators. (Think of the politics of blame in anti-welfare culture, in which tax breaks for the rich may go unnoticed, but welfare and resources for the unemployed are seen as "taking" from working people. Income is flowing up, but the hatred points downward.)

Ultimately, prejudicial hatred chooses an unfitting target for hatred and holds morally objectionable action tendencies and aims. As such, it is not worthy of any moral defence.

Retributive hatred. In 1912, W. E. B. Du Bois began publishing an annual issue of the NAACP's *The Crisis* entitled "The Children's Number." This issue aimed to raise racial consciousness within young Black Americans, and as such felt obligated to report on the country's harrowing state of racial violence: the lynchings, the race riots, the public beatings. Yet, following the "Red Summer" of 1919, which saw white supremacists incite waves of violence and massacre within Black communities, Du Bois publicly announced his hesitations in sharing such reports with the young. He feared the effect it may have on the children, believing it may only foster hatred within them. To his point, he quoted with concern a letter he received from a 12-year-old girl who wrote, "I want to learn more about my race, so I want to begin early . . . *I hate the white man just as much as he hates me and probably more!*" (1920; emphasis added). "And yet," Du Bois asked, "can you blame the child?"

The hatred that this young girl displays is in the spirit of retributive hatred, which is hatred that targets a social group in power and is expressed by those without that power. Retributive hatred lacks the precision of hatred of an individual, and as such it is quite likely that this hatred will be directed at all members of the oppressive social group. The retributive hater won't see any path to forging peace with the enemy. Rather, the aim for those with retributive hatred is revenge against the social group in power. The hater wishes for some form of payback in response to the oppressors stripping their group of power, and this payback may emerge as a physical, mental, emotional, or social harm. In this sense, those with retributive hatred resent the position

of their oppressors, and their hatred fuels thoughts of revenge that they could carry out with the oppressor's own power.

The action tendency of retributive hatred is reactivity; these haters are defensive and responsive to moves made by the social elites. This variation of hatred parallels the emotive features of Cherry's Ressentiment Rage, echoing the sentiment that "they define themselves only against the other. . . . Reactive people can only see themselves as a response to and in opposition to others" (2021, 20).

Regarding their perspective, retributive haters embody the same kind of "zero-sum game way of thinking" as the oppressive group. These haters structure their understanding of power around those who have it. For this reason, they believe that they cannot win unless their oppressors lose. From this perspective, the only path to social ascent is through the oppressor's sharp descent.

Their group's minoritised status prompts them to have an overly wide scope for their hatred. Unlike prejudicial hatred, this hatred is always steeped in moral reasons, and the haters have legitimate reasons to judge the oppressor's character. However, the target lacks a certain degree of moral precision, and thereby includes unfitting targets within its scope.

Misanthropic hatred. In many variations of hatred, the wrongness of the emotion stems from its targeted nature; when hatred focuses on certain individuals or groups, it can be judged on issues of fairness, or for failing to uphold notions of justice. Yet, some forms of hatred cannot be criticised for their lack of fairness, mainly because the hatred is targeted at just about everyone. This is the case for misanthropic hatred, whereby the agent feels slighted by the world, and as such holds an uncompromising hatred for all humans.[8] At its broadest, the target of hatred is not humans, but human vices. These haters may believe that humans are characteristically too vicious to be loved, and that their viciousness warrants one's hatred. Other misanthropic haters may zoom into specific human vices, basing their hatred on vices such as poor treatment of the environment or cruelty to animals. The most sympathetic cases of misanthropy will likely be those of people who are broken by the horrors and atrocities of the world around them, to a point where they struggle to recognise any good within it.

The action tendency for the misanthrope is to isolate themself from others. This is not to say that they always opt to physically remove themself from others' company, as they may find comfort in emotionally distancing themself and feeling superior around others.

The aim of misanthropic hatred is to turn away from society, either through isolation or violence to others. Take, for instance, Theodore "Ted" Kaczynski, better known as the Unabomber. Kaczynski resolved to fight industrialisation and environmental destruction, spending almost two decades targeting people in a nationwide bombing campaign (FBI 2021). On the one hand, Kaczynski isolated himself, seeking solitude away from others, but at the same time he felt compelled to communicate his message and hatred through violence onto the public.

8. It is important to note that not all misanthropy is characterised by hatred. For instance, in "Misanthropy and the Hatred of Humankind" (2019), Ian James Kidd argues that hateful misanthropy is quite uncommon.

Naturally, a dark stance on our moral condition can mutate into harmful and violent ends. Bernard Williams warned that hatred of human failings can devolve into a "desolating misanthropy which can itself be a source of cruelty . . . [and] destroy almost any virtue" (1985, 6). Ironically, through misanthropic hatred, one can become an exemplar of the vices that one hates.

Clash hatred. Sometimes when we hate it doesn't feel righteous nor world-echoing—it seems small, perhaps even a bit petty. The truth is that our hatred does not always mark a moral preference, but sometimes a personal one. Think of the rich neighbour who is chronically and exhaustingly lucky. Or consider the customer who is consistently difficult (but not rude) to his barista. Or sometimes we can hate someone purely because *they hated us first*. Truthfully, it is not hard to find examples where we exhibit clash hatred, where we hate individuals whose character unbearably rubs us the wrong way, clashes against our own, or reliably infuriates us.

Clash hatred is targeted at individuals rather than groups or types, and as such may look wildly different in each case. Despite this, a few factors seem to remain unchanged; for instance, the aim of clash hatred is to limit our contact with the hated as much as possible. Perhaps the hater bows out to the backroom when they see the customer enter, or they intentionally avoid events where they may interact with the hated. In line with this aim, the action tendency of clash hatred is aversion. This may manifest as aversion to the individual, to their help and contributions, or even to their cause.

Clash hatred is fuelled by a perspective of self-importance, specifically the belief that one should not be subjected to this sort of unpleasantness in their own circumstance. This hatred may be accompanied by thoughts such as "I shouldn't have to deal with this," and as such the hater centres the value of the hate onto themself. I do not take this variety of hatred to mark a moral sentiment about the hated individual, but rather to denote a highly negative preference toward their company. Thus, those with clash hatred hate for an amoral reason, one which is ultimately a morally bad reason to hate.

Beauvoirian hatred. Beauvoirian hatred, as I conceive of it, is morally unique compared to other varieties of hatred. Beauvoirian hatred is one variation (there are others!) which can be morally valuable to us. As such, this is the variety that I set out to explore and defend. Named after feminist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir, Beauvoirian hatred is a moral response to moral abomination and is valuable in defending the just. Though Beauvoir's own work on hatred inspires many of my sentiments, the conception and formulation of Beauvoirian hatred is my own, and does not fully reflect Beauvoir's views. Rather, I give it this name to honour Beauvoir's intuition on how hatred legitimises our negative thoughts towards others. Hatred is how we emotively sign our name against a target, allowing us to morally stand apart.

In "An Eye for an Eye," Beauvoir tells the story of how she learned to hate. She claims that prior to World War II she could not truly understand what hatred was. Rather, she assigned enemies or criminals feelings of contempt or pity, and while murderers may have filled her with horror, she was unable to hate them. Yet during and following the war, Beauvoir believes, she and many others learned to hate a certain kind of enemy (2004, 246), namely, those who are "conscious authors of genuine evil . . . [those who treat] fellow men like objects, when by torture, humiliation, servitude, assassination, one denies them their existence as men" (248).

In line with this, the targets of Beauvoirian hatred are those who are complicit in, or are perpetrators of, the degradation of an agent into a thing.[9] (Consider the hatred one feels, and *should feel*, for a human trafficker. Or the hatred held for a serial abuser.) This hatred focuses and condemns an individual agent's moral character.

Beauvoirian hatred is not directly focused at changing or reforming the hated, but rather aims at improving (or sustaining) the moral community by signalling that this type of character is unacceptable.[10] Here, hate's role is to assert the absolute necessity of respect for persons and to condemn and disavow those who fail to uphold this principle. This hatred declares to the hated, "Your moral character is not fit for, nor welcome in, my moral community. Back off." With Beauvoirian hatred, one treats injustices seriously within one's community, and aims to make it clear that the offenders (the hated) and us (the haters) do not just have different opinions but are in normative opposition to one another. Not only are they opposed, but Beauvoirian hatred asserts the rightness of justice and the wrongness of injustice; and by *hating*, it condemns the character of those who share this viciousness.[11]

In line with its aim, Beauvoirian hatred's action tendency is to signal one's own moral intentions, or more particularly to signal moral disdain of the hated character. It motivates us to "get the word out" and to communicate that the hated is morally unacceptable. This may be through publicly criticising the hated, taking steps to not include them within the moral community, or even to support the hated's removal from said community. While these actions may seem quite varied, the key similarity is that all of them are motivated to signal staunch condemnation of character. The behaviours motivated by this hatred will persist until the threatening moral character has either adjusted or vacated the moral community.

The perspective of Beauvoirian hatred is that justice without hate is a pretense. Or, to echo Beauvoir, it is to see emotion as "the metaphysical basis of the idea of justice" (249). This perspective is fuelled by the belief that perpetrators, victims, and others in the community are capable and worthy agents, whose actions and beliefs have moral weight and social consequence. Emotions can often reveal our values in the world; feelings express who we are and motivate our actions. In this case, to hate is to reveal what one holds worthy of hatred. It is to show what one finds morally abominable and unacceptable within a moral community. My point, and Beauvoir's as well, is that some people *should* be hated. And that we, as a moral community, must create and maintain the good by hating the evil. In this sense, hate is an essential moral emotion, so much so that a failure to hate may constitute a failure to take injustice seriously on an emotional level (Cox and Levine 2021, 178). In this way, hatred is not just powerful in that it asserts the wrongness of injustice, but it is also the only way in which we can properly address the severity of it.

In this section, I have taxonomised hatred to highlight why we should avoid treating hatred as a monolith. Next, I argue that Beauvoirian hatred is valuable to moral agents.

9. One might worry that some forms of injustices will not be captured by Beauvoirian hatred, and they would be right! The scope of Beauvoirian hatred is narrow, and as such, many cases of injustice and bigotry will not be captured by this variation. However, I do not take this to be a fault of Beauvoirian hatred, but rather an indication that there is a need for further inquiry on variations of hatred, those which are better situated to identify other injustices.

10. Additionally, it's important to note that although Beauvoirian hatred does not aim at changing the hated, it may consequently spur moral growth through its effects on the community.

11. Despite Beauvoirian hatred being a fitting response to injustice, this does not mean that it will always be a morally appropriate emotion to have. The hater may incorrectly identify her target or the injustice at stake. In other words, she can be wrong about who is a fitting target for Beauvoirian hatred, or why they are a fitting target.

4. Beauvoirian Hatred

4.1 Hate's Benefits

In this section, I briefly examine the numerous benefits and values of Beauvoirian hate, which will often be referred to simply as hate from this point on. I argue that hatred can (1) be a self-affirming (or allying) response, (2) create a normative chasm between the offenders and us regarding notions of justice, and (3) grant the hater a sense of finality.

Firstly, hating can be understood as a defensive and self-affirming response to injustice. As Pamela Hieronymi highlights, unchallenged wrongs against us in our past can stand as present threats to self-esteem (2001). By seeing moral injuries as communicative messages of worth, a failure to address the moral harm of the wrong (rather than seeing it as just another hurt) is also a failure to acknowledge one's own value. Thus, hating those who are characteristically vicious—a rapist, a zealous homophobe, or a coworker who intentionally undermines one's projects—is a defensive response for one's conception of self-worth, esteem, and value. Jeffrie Murphy (1988a, 35) emphasises this point, saying:

> If I count morally as much as anyone else (as surely I do), a failure to resent moral injuries done to me is a failure to care about the moral value incarnate in my own person (that I am, in Kantian language, an end in myself) and thus a failure to care about the very rules of morality.

Similarly, sharing the attitude of hatred with a victim of serious wrongs can defend a conception of their worth and value within the moral community or within one's own eyes.

Thus, hatred can be a powerful tool with which to reassert value and moral worth within a community. By hating, I am not only condemning the hated, but I am affirming the victim's moral value. This hatred is infused with moral content because it tracks that the hated has committed a serious moral wrong; that this wrong proceeded from morally wicked character; that the victim deserved better, and so on. All of this is to say that hatred may positively spur a sense of allegiance to ourselves and to the victims of injustice, through which we challenge the offenders to defend a conception of moral worth.

4.2 The Fittingness Objection

At this point, someone may agree that hating can be good in this way but argue that the right way to hate is not by targeting an individual (or their character), but by hating the wrong itself. After all, people are rarely, if ever, monolithically bad. One may have an overarching vicious character but not be inherently evil; and even so, people's characters can certainly change. Hence, one might note that we can hate the moral injury without hating the injurer, doing as Cherry suggests and morally "[redirecting] our hatred from vicious people to the vice" (2021, 148).

From this reasoning, a person comes to hate racism rather than racists. Yet, when saying that we hate the vice, we can conceive of vice in at least two different ways: either conceptually or in action. For instance, one can either hate racism as a concept or hate the perpetuations of said concept. Taking hate conceptually seems both unproductive and vague, as it is not explicitly clear what the value of hating a concept is. My hatred of racism *simpliciter* does not feel particularly targeted toward any instance of it. Further, it seems impersonally related to the moral injury at hand, and it is our hatred spurred by these moral injuries that defends self-worth.

It seems more productive that those who suggest hatred of the vice (rather than of the vicious) suggest hating the vice in action. Continuing with this example, it is to hate that racist things happen. However, my hatred that racist things happen is intimately connected to *someone* acting. Racism is indexed to actors and institutions, so to hate that racism happens is also to hate the agents responsible for perpetuating it. To expand on this point, we can consider the Dormant Racist. This individual is staunchly racist but does no racist acts and therefore does not perpetuate racism. If my hate is of perpetuations of racism or *racism in practice*, then I should hold no hatred for this vice, seeing as no action has been committed. However, I can (and should) just hate that a person is racist. I can hate an individual for identifying with awful principles that are telling of their moral character. Hampton (1988, 61) notes that values people champion become "tangled up" with their character "in the same way a cancer can get mixed up with the healthy cells of one's body." In this sense, whether we hate the vice conceptually or in practice, hating the principles entails hating the person who holds them. As Beauvoir (2004, 248) puts it:

> Neither death nor suffering nor captivity are abominable in themselves. An abomination arises only at the moment that a man treats fellow men like objects . . . when one denies them their existence as men.

In this sense, it is not the act alone that is hateful, it is the injustice that comes from the cruelty of the actor. Only agents are "conscious authors of genuine evil," and as such they are the only fitting targets of personal hate.[12]

Ultimately, it seems that we can have good reasons to hate someone (e.g. a cruel racist). So, if we tell people to redirect their hatred from the agent to the vice, we are putting the burden on the victim to change their mindset. This is a difficult project to assign. Thus, if philosophers do want to encourage the redirection of hatred from the vicious to the vice, they will need good reason to justify burdening victims with this task.

Those who argue that we should resist hating individuals do highlight something important that we can learn from: we must be careful to not portray those that we hate as *all-evil beings*. Hatred can be valuable in combating unjust characters, but by describing hate like "a righteous cosmic drama—as a holy war against ultimate sin and evil" (Murphy 1988b, 100), we seem to miss something important about the hated. Namely, that despite being unjust or morally abominable, they are human.

This point is compelling to me, in part because it is rather poetic. But acknowledging that someone is human does not require us to suspend or halt our deepest moral responses to them. In fact, hatred can function as a recognition of moral agency, rather than a denial of humanity.

The danger that Murphy warns of does not lie in hatred itself, but rather in mythologising the object of hatred, transforming them solely into an evil abstraction, a process that likely justifies extreme cruelty to the target. However, rejecting hatred entirely based on this risk produces a different problem: it risks trivialising profound injustices by demanding emotional regulation where the moral gravity calls for stronger responses. Crucially, hating a person does not entail denying their humanity, so despite this risk we will need better reasons to burden victims with this task.

As it stands, I believe we have reason to hate the vicious, and as previously stated, our hatred of them can protect our self-worth and moral value. This feature does not need to be unique to hatred to be valuable from it.

12. We can also consider Jeffrie Murphy's work here—"It is, of course, impossible to hate the sin and not the sinner if the sinner is intimately identified with his sin" (1988a, 24)—or Beauvoir's belief that "one also does not judge the act without judging the man: one does not have meaning or reality without the other" (2004, 256).

4.3 Hating as Love of Justice

In addition to hatred as a self-affirming response, hate is further valuable in that it creates a normative chasm between us and the offenders. Hatred disengages its target; it pushes the offender away from oneself (and perhaps others). This normative chasm draws the line of justice, making it clear that we are not just of different opinions, we are in normative opposition. Recalling that hatred targets those with persisting characters, this normative chasm is valuable, serving as a reminder to treat injustices seriously within our communities. As such, hatred which is born to protect justice holds decisive love for a moral community, and acts as a tool against wrongs. This is a great value of Beauvoirian hatred: it affirms the role we all have in maintaining respect for one another as agents and for morality and justice *simpliciter*.

I should be clear about what exact role hate plays within justice. According to Beauvoir, hatred is foundational to justice (2004, 168). That is, hatred does emotive work that other emotions are unable to accomplish. I argue that hatred's power comes from the unique symbolic force that it lends.

At this point, readers may agree that hatred's aim of "signalling one's moral intentions" is laudable, but argue that this function is shared by most moral emotions; so, what does hate, specifically, bring to the table?

The difference between hate and other means of vice signalling lies in what is being signalled and how that signal functions socially. In the face of moral harms, we can respond with resentment, anger, contempt, or the like. But at times, all of these can feel emotionally insufficient. Sometimes the moral gravity of a situation (or individual, injustice, etc.) can demand more of us.

When we are young, we constantly hear about why we ought not hate. We train people that hatred is powerful, that it is consuming, and that it is *wrong*. Considering this social caution, the mere presence of hatred is a kind of rebellion—its mere existence is enough to clearly communicate strong passion or an indication of one's values.

In a society that cautions hatred, hating becomes emotionally akin to someone softspoken using a cuss word. It elevates the stakes because of its unique force—only through hatred can the hated understand how serious you are about the values at stake. Only through hatred will the hated appreciate how unwavering and great the chasm between you is. And the rarity of the emotional expression leads to greater social disruption.

One may wonder at this point: does hatred offer something that mere vice signalling does not? The difference here is that hatred emotionally backs our vice signalling, by aligning oneself rationally and emotionally with it. Hatred is telling of one's fundamental values, and as such it is deeply personal. As Damian Cox and Michael Levine (2021, 178) consider:

> A failure to hate evil may be a failure to take evil fully seriously at an emotional level. It may be to treat evil as merely a problem to be overcome, not as a phenomenon to be lamented and a battle to be fought.

This is why hatred stings so deeply, leaves such a lasting mark, or, as Beauvoir phrases it, "bites into the world" (2004, 258). Hatred is powerful for its ability to symbolically set us apart from one another, to create a normative chasm, and to maintain an unwavering position against degradation and abuse of another. Thus, it is only justice founded on hatred which properly condemns and champions moral values.

4.4 Hating with Finality

Lastly, underlying hatred's aversive tendencies and its absence of good-will is evidence that there is *finality* in hatred's judgement. Hatred does not merely register wrongdoing or demand repair; it settles on a judgement about the target. This sense of finality greatly benefits the hater as, unlike with other emotions, hatred does not seek to keep an agent in relationship with its target. Hence, hate frees us from caring and worrying about the moral improvement of the hated. We can disinvest.[13]

The notion of disinvestment needs some sharpening. The idea is not that hatred frees us from cognitive preoccupation. On the contrary, hatred can be obsessive and consuming. The disinvestment concerns a specific dimension: the withdrawal of any commitment to the target's moral transformation as something one remains relationally answerable to.

And this disinvestment appears to be unique among the reactive attitudes. Unlike other emotions, hatred actually represents the target as irredeemable, due in part to its fittingness features. While other emotions may become less fitting over time, once you have good reason to hate, you will *always* have reason to hate. In this sense, our reasons for hatred will not expire in light of our target's growth or moral repair. Similar backward-evaluations of emotions have been defended for the emotions of anger, resentment, and particularly for grief (see e.g. Callard 2017, Shoemaker 2018, and Marušić 2018). This reasoning, in brief, goes that hatred is rationalised by facts about a person which have endured in their target, and that these facts are entirely based upon the past or present of one's character (considering that we do not hate one for who they *may* become). And because the facts of the past are unchangeable, hatred can be said to remain forever fitting. Some agents can be so abominable that this gives us a reason to hate forever, regardless of what may happen next. Thus, on my view, the grounds of one's fitting hatred cannot be truly eliminated, giving us reason to hate forever.[14]

Some readers may resist this claim, as to some this may seem harsh. Yet, the characters that inspire hatred are often harsh themselves. Consider the child who grows up with an abusive mother. Even if decades later the mother apologises and shows genuine moral growth, the hatred her child feels is still apt, as we cannot always separate who someone was from who someone is. For those unconvinced, consider the multitude of Nazis who later apologised, perhaps sincerely, for their atrocities. Surely, forgiveness is optional for their victims, but should we demand they let go of their hatred due to a new character? Certainly not.

Finality is demonstrated best by Dr. Chanequa Walker-Barnes, a clinical psychologist and womanist theologian. In her piece, "Prayer of a Weary Black Woman," Walker-Barnes asks God to:

> Please help me to hate White people. Or at least to want to hate them. At least, I want to stop caring about them, individually and collectively. I want to stop caring about their misguided, racist souls, to stop believing they can be better, that they can stop being racist.[15]

13. One might argue that hatred is compatible, and perhaps intimately causally related to, the hater being incredibly engaged with the hated, though their irredeemable flaws would serve as the focus of our attention rather than their moral improvement. On this view, the hater does not divest from the hated, but could in fact be all-consumed by them. While this is no doubt true of many forms of hatred, I do not take this to be a feature of Beauvoirian hatred, whose central aim is the protection of the moral community from the hated. To the extent that Beauvoirian hatred draws our attention to the hated, it does so with the goal of protecting ourselves and others from the hated's vicious ways. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection.
14. Other philosophers have criticised hatred for being inherently unfitting (see, e.g., Szanto 2020, 2021).
15. This piece does go on to clarify which White people she wants permission to hate, and ultimately concludes in her choosing to align herself with love. However, it does powerfully demonstrate all of the benefits and reasons one may have to hate. In an effort to be transparent with this piece, please read more from the author here: https://drchanequa.wordpress.com/2021/04/08/prayer-of-a-weary-black-woman/ (*Dr Chanequa's Musings*, April 8, 2021).

The exact benefit that Walker-Barnes seeks through hatred is its finality. The appeal to hatred is an appeal to finality—to the possibility of ceasing to hope, to desire, to remain affectively tethered to those who cause harm; the powerful ability to disinvest, to withdraw care, and to move forward with a life no longer defined by one's relationship to the hated.

As a humorous case, consider the scene from *Mad Men* in which Michael Ginsberg confronts Don Draper in an elevator, upset because Don rejected Ginsberg's idea and went ahead with his own pitch. Ginsberg, angry and frustrated, says to Don, "I feel bad for you." Don turns to him coldly and delivers the line: "I don't think about you at all."[16]

Don's line strikes me as compatible with the finality of hatred. The cold-blooded line's power comes in part from its ability to dismiss someone as inconsequential, as someone who has no impact on the hater's life, let alone their thoughts. It is to dispute or dispel thoughts of active engagement with the target.

Importantly, I am not taking Don to be a moral hater, but I am taking him to be an agent who understands and values the finality associated with hatred. We don't need to think about, nor care for the hated's role in our lives. They do not inform our thoughts.

5. Emotional Counterparts Objection

At this point I have argued for the distinct benefits of hatred. There may remain a concern that we can get the same benefits via less risky emotions.

> I'll formalise this criticism to allow for a more in-depth analysis.
> [P1] Hatred provides certain benefits *x* (e.g., defends self-worth, offers finality, etc.)
> [P2] Emotions such as anger or contempt can offer the benefits *x* offered by hatred.
> [P3] Anger and contempt are less risky than hatred.
> [P4] If a less risky emotion can offer the same benefits as hatred, then hatred is not unique in its value.

Thus, if that is so, then:

> [C] Hatred is not unique in its value.

But this reasoning is flawed; it is a mistake to conflate the similarities of these emotions with their ability to do the same emotive work. In this section, I will address these emotions in order of their increasing relevance to hatred, showing how although these emotions are similar, they each carve up unique and valuable emotive space (*contra* premise 2). This section also serves to clarify the value of hatred, making it clear that it is the *appropriateness* of hatred, and not solely its benefits, which make it valuable.

5.1 Anger

Anger has been brought up several times throughout this paper, but there is good reason to further explore the differences between anger and hatred; especially considering how many who defend anger reject hatred, and argue that anger can be used in similar (and allegedly better) manners.

16. AMC's Mad Men (Season 5, Episode 9, "Dark Shadows"). Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this example.

Anger and hatred are similar in several respects. Both emotions are powerful, negative evaluations which are critical of their respective targets. Yet, the similarities largely stop there. Regarding their appraisals, anger differs from hatred because its target is appraised as being capable of change (Fischer et al. 2018, 139). Hatred, however, represents the target as incapable of change. Further, unlike hatred, anger does not necessarily focus on the global target itself, meaning that its appraisals can target characteristics or actions carried out by the target, but do not need to be directed at one's character or being. Further distinctions between anger and hatred can be found in their action tendencies—while hatred is an aversive emotion, one which disengages from its target, anger is engaging.

We can plainly see the ways in which anger differs from hatred. Anger often (but not exclusively) focuses on actions rather than character and spurs *active engagement* with its target. Additionally, anger is not associated with a finality of judgement for its target; rather, it invests in its target's growth through engagement.

5.2 Contempt

In many ways, contempt seems to be the emotion most akin to hatred: it's evaluative of character, aversive, and it allows the agent to somewhat disinvest from its target. Yet, although there has been a recent surge of philosophical defences of contempt, these works have largely neglected or mischaracterised hatred.

Let's begin by considering the nature of contempt, as characterised by Macalester Bell. Contempt is an aversive emotion which targets a person in virtue of some enduring quality of their identity. The target is taken to be inferior to the agent and, like with hatred, contempt takes whole persons as its target. In cases of contempt, the emotion's target is necessarily seen as inferior. This is due to contempt's hierarchical and comparative elements, such that the contemptible is fundamentally relational and reflexive (Bell 2013, 97). While this downward-looking evaluation may be a common theme within hatred, it is not a constitutive element of the emotion. Bell makes this point clearly in saying that "[hatred] doesn't always presuppose a comparative evaluation of the target in the way contempt does" (58). We may even feel hatred for those to whom we assign an upward-looking evaluation. In fact, we can hate someone because they are *better* than us. Consider the clash hatred one may feel for their overachieving, high energy peer. Maybe the target has done nothing morally wrong in behaving this way, but I do think it is possible to hate them for embodying qualities that we crave but do not possess. As stated, I don't mean to offer up a moral defence of hatred of this sort, but I think it is reasonable to say that we *can* hate in this way, in a way that could be reduced to simple thoughts like "Hey man, you're making me look bad."[17]

In addition to hating people for being seemingly better than us, we can also hate people for being *too much* like us—for presenting the same relevant faults of character that we hate in ourselves. These haters may know that they are targeting another for a character that they share, and others may recognise this too. Yet, through internalised hatred, the hater hates a person without necessarily making the object of their hatred inferior to themself—rather, both are held in equally low standing. Author Herman Hesse echoes this sentiment, writing: "If you hate a person, you hate something in him that is part of yourself. What isn't part of ourselves doesn't disturb us" (2017). Hesse is right to insist on the feasibility of hatred of this sort, though I am sceptical that we necessarily hate for this mirroring. Unlike contempt, hatred does not entail a necessary comparative evaluation of the target, so it follows that we do not always label our hatred's targets as inferior.

17. A concern I find interesting is whether someone can have Beauvoirian hatred for an agent who they take to be better than themselves. While I imagine it would be incredibly rare, I do find this cognitively and emotionally consistent.

Another feature that discerns hatred from contempt is the finality of hatred's evaluation. While hatred represents the target as irredeemable, contempt does not judge one way or another about a target's redeemability. In fact, contempt's aptness is reflexive to change upon the moral growth of the target. Regarding the aptness of contempt as an emotion, Bell (2013 247–48) writes:

> If someone has undergone a total moral transformation, then it seems inapt to continue to harbor feelings of contempt toward her. If contempt would no longer be appropriate, then it may seem that we have an obligation to overcome our contempt for her.

Though Bell does later note that a person cannot be fully separated from who they once were (and as such our concerns of aptness will be confusing to navigate), contempt still overly burdens the contemptuous agent with the target's moral growth. In the case of hatred, once we have *good* reason to hate, our target's moral growth does not need to concern us anymore. We are freed from caring whether the hated morally improves because, regardless of their improvements, we have disinvested ourselves from the target. Thus, despite the close parallels these emotions share, hatred differs from contempt in that it is neither hierarchical nor comparative, and because of its emotive finality.

5.3 Emotional Overlap

Ultimately, despite their similarities, hatred is *not* the same emotion as anger or contempt. Further, because of its contrastive properties and motivational force, hatred can do unique emotive work. As discussed in Section 4, only hatred can offer this finality of judgement and, as such, it releases the hater from concerning themself with their target's moral growth.

Yet, while we have reason to separate hatred from these other emotions, it would be wrong to dismiss their overlap, as our emotive lives are not orderly. People will often feel more than one emotion at the same time, which can lead to difficulties with conflicting emotions.[18] Take this case:

> *The College Roommate:* Evelyn's roommate, Deidre, is a nightmare to live with. She's rude, belittling, racist, and constantly making a mess of their shared space. Evelyn hates Deidre, and has given up on Deidre ever being a respectful roommate or person. Yet, whenever Deidre refuses to clean her overflowing, unwashed dishes, or makes degrading comments to Evelyn and her friends, Evelyn finds herself incredibly angry at Deidre.

Evelyn's situation is sympathetic, and for many, I assume, it is unfortunately familiar. Despite the finality of Evelyn's judgement of Deidre, she still finds herself angry about Deidre's disrespect. In this way, Evelyn finds herself with conflicting motivations (engagement *versus* aversion) and may have trouble deciding which action to perform. She may toggle through different emotions, switching between anger and hatred at any given moment. When we have a lot of reasons that spur warring emotions, we can suffer with emotional and motivational conflict. We may see our target as both inside and outside of our moral community (both within and without our sphere of change). Thus, we may be stuck on how to feel or act toward the respective target. In Evelyn's case, these thoughts may include, *Do I even bother discussing this with her? She's a horrible person; nothing will change that. Yet don't* I *still deserve the chance to voice what's bothering me?*

18. While discussing overlapping and warring emotions, one might question whether we can feel both love and hatred for an individual. Although this argument is outside the focus of this paper, I am inclined to believe that we can both love and hate an individual at the same time—though only one of these will be fitting.

It seems clear that hatred and anger can be felt simultaneously, and I suspect that some individuals may find this troubling for hatred. After all, if hatred can do these unique, powerful things, is it only valuable when it isn't put into conflict with a competing emotion?

This is an important challenge, and one that deserves further attention, considering how often we do face emotional overlap. To first address this challenge, I must admit that I am not convinced that the presence of conflicting emotions truly eliminates the usefulness of each emotion. I am inclined to believe that some benefits of hatred will remain, regardless of muddling emotions. For instance, hating still seems to condemn the hated, and it also still affirms the victim's moral value, regardless of the paired emotions that it wars with. While the finality, or the ability to fully disinvest from someone, will surely be limited, I do believe that hatred is still able to lessen the burden of more active emotions. Nevertheless, I will address this challenge as if the benefits of hatred are truly eliminated when we face emotional conflict; thus, I will question whether there is still value in feeling hatred when its benefits are fully stifled.

Call this the "Emotional Overlap" criticism.

> [P1] Hatred is valuable for its unique ability to offer finality from its target.
> [P2] Anger involves being engaged with its target.
> [P3] Anger and hatred can be felt for the same target at the same time (*t1*).
> [P4] If the unique benefits of hatred are eliminated, then there is no value in feeling hatred.
> [P5] Feeling both anger and hatred for the same target at *t1* eliminates the unique benefits of hatred.

Therefore:

> [C] There is no value in feeling hatred when it emotionally overlaps with relevant emotions.

The argument assumes that hatred's value lies solely in its unique ability to offer finality (P1) and then claims that if this unique benefit is eliminated, hatred has no value (P4). But this is far too restrictive.

This argument is misguided in part because premise 4 is false. If the emotion is morally apt, there is still value in feeling it, beyond its mere usefulness; when we evaluate value, we are not only concerned with benefit, but also with justification. Consider a different case of emotional overlap, this time where an individual struggles with warring emotions of guilt and pride:

> *The Salesman:* Bill sells fake pharmaceutical products to customers at his job. He is extremely good at it, so much so that his boss announces him as the company's top seller. Bill is proud of this—he worked hard and takes pride in having high sales. At the same time, Bill notices that his thoughts are laced with guilt due to the nature of his job. Overall, Bill considers himself proud of his work.

I take it that in cases like this, the efficacy—and therefore the benefits—of guilt are weakened by Bill's pride. Similarly, his pride is likewise made more confusing and thereby weaker by the presence of his guilt. Yet, it's still good that Bill feels guilt, despite the lack of instrumental benefit that the emotion has for him. In a similar way, it also seems good that Evelyn has thoughts fuelled by hatred, as far as Deidre is a proper target for it. What College Roommate and The Salesman both have in common is that they highlight how our emotions can give us conflicting tendencies, aims, and perspectives toward people and situations. Notably, these cases may

be deemed asymmetrical because, in College Roommate, both of Evelyn's emotions are morally apt, while The Salesman sees Bill with a morally inappropriate emotion for his situation: pride.

As it is, I am sympathetic to the idea that if an emotion is *morally* apt, then it is good to feel it, even if the emotion does not prove useful to us.[19] For this reason, it can be said that Evelyn's anger and hatred are both appropriate, while Bill's pride is inappropriate. Bill ought to feel guilty for his job and, morally, he should not feel proud of his work.

Ultimately, hatred can be accompanied by a multitude of feelings, and will often relate to contempt and anger. The overlaps of these emotions make them particularly likely to be felt in tandem, and this may at times dampen the benefits that these respective emotions provide. However, this overlap does not diminish the value of our distinct emotions.

Sometimes hatred will win in cases of emotional overlap, trumping its adversarial emotions. However, it doesn't need to win to be valuable. It can even be granted that hatred will not always be valuable to us. As it stands, I am merely motivated to argue that hatred *can* be valuable in certain cases and, as such, deserves recognition as a legitimate tool to be used against injustice. As I argue it, hatred has a legitimate—or moral, important, or indispensable—role to play in our emotive lives. While the strength of its benefits largely depends on its efficacy, the justification for hatred comes from the *appropriateness* of feeling it, not from the benefits it may provide.

Thus, while I have set out in this paper to examine the many benefits and values that hatred can provide, to perhaps win over those who are intuitively against hatred, I do not take these benefits to justify the existence of hatred. I take it that the existence of injustice and the authors of evil justify our hatred, and that the benefits I have outlined in Section 4 merely create instrumental value.

6. Conclusion (A Hard Truth Made Softer)

The hard truth: sometimes haters get something right about their respective targets. Sometimes people deserve to be hated. Hatred will not always be fitting, and when it is fitting it will not always be appropriately expressed or manifested. Yet, when we give hatred this one-dimensional treatment, we do not allow ourselves to appreciate the nuanced ways in which hatred can be valuable.

My goal has been to not only get a better understanding of the varieties of hatred, but also to encourage this important part of our moral lives that has gone under-theorised: the ways in which we may hate *rightly*. Beauvoirian hatred is one of these ways. I hope that further investigation into hatred captures something important about the way in which hatred may serve us in the unending fight against injustice.

19. For further exploration of fitting-attitude theories of value, see Howard 2023.

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