“It is Humanizing to Resist It with Rage”: Getting Angry at Social Injustices as a Subjective and Political Reassessment of Oneself
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59123/d32da850Keywords:
Anger, social injustice, self-respect, epistemic feelings, OppressionAbstract
In the wake of a feminist and decolonial heritage, recent philosophical contributions have underlined the epistemic value of the emotion of anger experienced at injustices of a political nature (Romano, 2018; Srinivasan, 2018; Cherry, 2021). These publications participate in opposing and refuting a widespread political idea and traditional philosophical argument: anger would be an obstacle to the elaboration of any rational thinking or claims concerning political life, in which social injustices occupy a central role.
The victims of social injustices are constantly denied respect, recognition, apologies, as well as any form of epistemic or political participation that would threaten the status quo of their oppression. In this regard, the experience of self-respect, the acquisition of further knowledge about one’s social situation, and the expression of one’s moral and political demands of respect and dignity, are considered to be essential features of resistance to oppression. They can even be taken as necessary conditions for engaging in an active and efficient struggle against social injustices.
Therefore, in line with the contemporary efforts to keep questioning the potential role of emotions in epistemic and political participation and in one’s opposition to injustices, this paper aims at investigating how the experience of anger at social injustices consists of a subjective and political reassessment of oneself as worthy of respect, capable of appropriate emotions, and legitimate in opposing present and further wrongs.
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